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## ABSTRACT

This research models a Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing attack set-up, and investigation of defense mechanisms using available open-source software, and hardware. The GPS spoofing attack and defense architecture is focused on application to a DJI Matrice 100 Quadcopter. Only the L1 (civilian) GPS frequency is used.

## SPOOFING ATTACK HARDWARE/SOFTWARE

### Hardware:

- 1575.42 MHz Passive Garmin Antenna
- BladeRF Software Defined Radio
- Laptop running Windows
- 60dB attenuator
- 2 x Bias tee (1 for dynamic spoofing)
- Active GPS Antenna with LNA (dynamic spoofing)
- Matrice 100
  - DJI Quadcopter to be spoofed
  - Added ESP8266 Wifi module for communication

### Open-Source Software:

- GPS-SDR-SIM
- GNSS-SDR (dynamic spoofing)
- DJI Onboard SDK
  - Modified UDP socket for communication with Matrice 100 over Wifi

## REFERENCES

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## GPS SPOOFING ATTACK - SETUP




Figure 1: GPS Spoofing Attack set-up

## ATTACK - RESULTS




Figure 2: GPS Spoofed Matrice 100 Data Output

## ATTACK – FUTURE WORK

Create dynamic spoofing setup using static spoofing building blocks

- Modify GPS-SDR-SIM software to generate continuous I-Q data output
- Create real time pipe from GPS-SDR-SIM output to BladeRF
- Use GNSS-SDR to decompose incoming GPS signal into stream for GPS-SDR-SIM input




Figure 3: Dynamic Spoofing Signal Generation

## GPS SPOOFING DEFENSE- METHODS

UAV Sensors to GPS comparison (investigated)

- Accelerometer & Gyroscope
- Kalman Filter + Camera (work-in-progress)

Synthetic Antenna Array -- Movement (future work)

- Monitor Amplitude/Phase correlation of different PRNs

Signal to Noise Ratio (work-in-progress)

- Spoofing increase of SNR (carrier to noise)

Other Methods (future work)

- Absolute Power Monitoring (additional hardware)
- Power versus receiver movement (additional hardware)
- L1/L2 Comparison (additional hardware)

## DEFENSE - RESULTS

Only accelerometer/gyroscope vs GPS receiver simple comparison method currently implemented.

- Kalman filter implemented, minor improvement without additional sensors (Camera)




Figure 4: Accelerometer/Gyroscope vs Spoofed GPS Receiver

## DEFENSE – FUTURE WORK

Begin implementation of signal to noise ratio measurements

- Requires decomposition of incoming GPS signal (GNSS-SDR)

Begin correlation measurement between signal parameters when moving (synthetic antenna array)

- Requires decomposition of incoming GPS signal (GNSS-SDR)

Expand upon sensor comparison

- Kalman filter than includes camera movement approximation